

# Case Study in Improving Protection System Reliability With Automatic NERC PRC-005 Inspection, Testing, Reporting, and Auditing

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**Abstract**—This paper is a case study of the design process and validation of a simple and effective solution to satisfy the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) PRC-005 protection system maintenance program (PSMP) requirements. The example solution is a protection system monitoring (PSM) application for an in-service system at a hydroelectric generating station. This PSM system uses simple digital communication to collect information from intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) to perform real-time validation and status reporting to keep components in working order and to quickly restore the malfunctioning components to proper operation. The PSM controller and all communications are separate from protection and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) communications channels to prevent the possibility of affecting these communications channels. Control is not possible via the PSM communication, and the links are safely added to in-service systems, which simplifies conformance for existing plants. The PSM controller has a real-time operator interface that provides an up-to-the-second audit status of compliance, detected anomalies, and true alarms. The embedded maintenance program automatically performs all of the possible PRC-005 maintenance program activities, including the following:

- **Verification** – a means of determining that the component is functioning correctly.
- **Monitoring** – the observation of the routine in-service operation of the component.
- **Testing** – the application of signals to a component to observe functional performance, observe output behavior, or diagnose problems.
- **Inspection** – an operator interface to present visible signs of component failure, reduced performance, and degradation.
- **Calibration** – the recommendations for and confirmation of the adjustment of the operating threshold or measurement accuracy of a measuring element to meet the intended performance requirement.
- **Upkeep** – the routine activities to ensure that the component remains in good working order and ensure the visibility of any hardware and software service advisories that are relevant to the device application.
- **Restoration** – the description and acknowledgement of the completion of actions to restore the proper operation of malfunctioning components.

Critical protection system components, including potential transformers, current transformers, relays, controllers, station dc supply, and communications channels, are automatically monitored for function and accuracy. The system includes the automatic collection of event reports and disturbance records to provide enterprise-level event storage and analysis. The system is

scalable in size and function. A discussion of future enhancements, such as trip circuit validation, is included in this paper. The isolation of the PSM system from the protection, control, and monitoring (PCM) network operation is also discussed to address system security.

The system was tested using the design of an actual hydroelectric generating station. The test also included a full simulation of the system.

Two major distinctions between traditional protection system maintenance and the testing performed by the PSM system are the automatic and the continuous nature of the reporting. The PSM system constantly performs evaluations on in-service equipment, evaluating and reporting the overall system health. The PSM system not only improves the overall reliability of the bulk electric system by performing real-time evaluations of critical protection system components but also reduces or eliminates fines due to a missed test.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), under the direction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), is responsible for improving the reliability of the North American bulk electric system (BES). This responsibility includes creating a compliance program to improve the protection system reliability of generation and transmission facilities that can impact the BES. This program is designed to ensure that the right protection system testing and maintenance practices are implemented to minimize the severity of a future system disturbance.

This paper references the NERC PRC-005-1 definitions of maintenance and testing reliability standard requirements in place at the time of publication, but these requirements are in the process of being updated with PRC-005-2. Under PRC-005-2, the definition of “protection systems” includes protective relays, associated communications systems, voltage- and current-sensing devices (including their circuits), dc control circuitry, and station dc supplies associated with protection functions [1].

Although it is not yet approved, there is a consensus that many of the changes defined in the PRC-005-2 draft for protection systems will be included when the standard update is official. These changes include a comprehensive protection system maintenance program (PSMP) and the approval to deploy maintenance based on condition or performance monitoring to help reduce or eliminate manual testing procedures. These changes will allow generation and

transmission owners to utilize the inherent capabilities of microprocessor-based protective relays and real-time automation systems to automatically test and validate many critical protection system components while also avoiding the downfalls of manual testing [2].

The California Department of Water Resources (CDWR) recognized this shift in testing procedures and initiated a program to design an integrated system that continuously monitors, tests, and validates many of the critical protection components identified in the PRC-005-1 reliability standard. An equal motivator was the desire to incorporate a system that could significantly enhance the awareness of the CDWR generation protection system and the many valuable assets CDWR protects via remote communications from their offices in Sacramento, California. This was critical to the small staff of protection engineers responsible for both generation and pumping stations distributed over a large geographic area.

This paper focuses on the CDWR design process and the development of a protection system monitoring (PSM) application using protective relays, a real-time automation controller, and reporting software. This system monitors, tests, validates, and reports many of the PRC-005-1-defined critical protection system components for both BES generation facilities and critical internal assets, such as pumping plants.

## II. CDWR GENERATION

The CDWR State Water Project (SWP) is the largest publicly built and operated water and power development and conveyance system in the world. The SWP was designed and is operated by CDWR. It includes a system of dams, reservoirs, and a main aqueduct that stretches across 700 miles of California, as shown in Fig. 1.



Fig. 1. CDWR State Water Project

The SWP includes a total of seven generation facilities. Three of these power plants are in the process of a relay replacement program, which includes upgrading from electromechanical relays to microprocessor-based relays. All three plants are required to meet the PRC-005-1 reliability standard.

Recognizing the inherent self-test and communications capabilities of microprocessor-based relays and the advancements in real-time automation controllers, CDWR protection engineers investigated the potential of implementing a system to perform real-time monitoring and reporting of CDWR critical protection system components.

## III. NERC PRC-005-1

NERC defines protection systems as including the following components:

- Protective relays, which respond to electrical quantities.
- Communications systems, which are necessary for the correct operation of protection functions.
- Voltage- and current-sensing devices and their circuits, which provide inputs to protective relays.
- Station dc supply, which is associated with protection functions.
- Control circuitry, which is associated with protection functions through the trip coil(s) of the circuit breakers and other interrupting devices.

As part of the PRC-005-1 reliability standard, NERC requires generation and transmission owners to maintain a PSMP, which includes maintenance testing procedures, testing intervals, and documented test results for each of these components. Its purpose is to verify that all critical components are in working order and that the proper operation of malfunctioning components is restored [3].

## IV. PSM DESIGN OVERVIEW

Using these requirements as guidelines, CDWR designed the PSM system to improve the overall reliability of their generation protection systems via the performance of real-time evaluations of numerous critical protection components. The results are automatically communicated to a centralized server, and maintenance reports are generated that are visualized for protection engineer review and then archived as component test documentation. Critical to the design is the availability of an existing secure communications infrastructure, which allows the small number of plant maintenance protection engineers to monitor the daily performance of remotely located protection systems. These capabilities help supplement manual protection system testing with an automated process that compensates for the lack of available qualified test technicians while also reducing maintenance outages and eliminating the difficulties of manually organizing and centralizing test result documentation over a large geographic area.

The PSM system performs real-time validation and reporting of critical protection system components, including

current transformers (CTs), potential transformers (PTs) and their circuits, protection communications, relay health, firmware, and settings.

The plant PSM system incorporates a real-time automation controller that acts as the PSM controller to poll connected generator protection relays for digital and analog values. The standalone PSM controller manages communications to all the intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) via a completely secure and isolated communications network that is separate from the protection, control, and monitoring (PCM) communications network. The standalone nature of the PSM communications network ensures that no new settings are required in the PCM system and that the PSM processes will not impact the performance of the PCM processes. The PSM controller evaluates component health by collecting and processing PSM data via preprogrammed component-specific evaluation criteria. The health of all monitored protection system components is documented in a single plant-level automated report that is sent to a centralized PSM server. This report serves the following purposes:

- Improves protection system awareness through daily reports that help identify potential failed components that may otherwise go unnoticed.
- Supports PRC-005-1 maintenance testing and documentation requirements, where the daily reports are used to reset the maintenance intervals for each of the monitored critical protection system components.
- Documents the occurrence and behavior of power system apparatus operations.
- Provides time-stamped information and evaluation for instant or periodic PSM audits.

The PSM system also includes automatic enterprise-level relay event report retrieval and storage capabilities, which are used to determine the reason an event occurred and to support documentation for PRC-005-1 component validation.

## V. THERMALITO POWER PLANT

The three CDWR generation plants that fall under the PRC-005-1 reliability standard as “key generating facilities” with transmission voltages above 100 kV are the Edward Hyatt Power Plant, Thermalito Power Plant, and Devil Canyon Power Plant. The development of the PSM system was based on the Thermalito Power Plant and designed for easy adaption to the other two plants. If successful, CDWR will consider installing PSM systems at the remaining four generation plants and at each of the large pumping plants.

The Thermalito Power Plant, shown in Fig. 2, is part of the Oroville-Thermalito Complex, located 70 miles north of Sacramento. The plant includes three 28 MVA units and one 36 MVA unit.

Each of the four generating units incorporates dual primary generator and transformer protection relays and one motor relay to protect the unit pump-back function. Each generator relay connects to CTs on both sides of the generator and shares a PT. Each transformer relay connects to CTs on the high and low sides of the transformer (see Fig. 3). The motor relay connects to separate CTs and PTs. With five relays

protecting each generating unit, the PSM system monitors a total of 20 relays.



Fig. 2. Thermalito Power Plant




Fig. 3. Thermalito Power Plant one-line diagram

## VI. EDMONSTON PUMPING PLANT

Though not part of the BES regulated by NERC, the Edmonston Pumping Plant, located near Bakersfield, California, is a critical asset for the operation of the CDWR SWP. Rather than monitoring the plant for compliance with PRC-005-1, CDWR wants to monitor this critical asset via predictive alarming in order to keep it online and avoid expensive downtime. This PSM design therefore satisfies both compliance and mission-critical situational awareness for operations.

The CDWR Edmonston Pumping Plant includes 14 80,000 hp synchronous motors that lift a column of water 2,000 feet over the Tehachapi Mountains at 4,000 cubic feet per second. Because of the size of the Edmonston Pumping Plant, along with similar pumping plants that support the SWP, CDWR is the largest single power user in the state of California. To capitalize on the differential between peak and off-peak energy pricing, CDWR prefers to generate during the day and pump at night. Unscheduled equipment outages may require off-peak generation and on-peak pumping to meet scheduled water deliveries, which can have significant cost consequences for CDWR customers.

### A. Event Description

On May 3, 2012, at 5:29 a.m., Edmonston transformer K2A was tripped offline by a transformer electromechanical B-phase current differential relay (87T). Plant personnel placed the transformer under clearance, and crews from Sacramento were dispatched to test the transformer. Testing of the transformer found no evidence of an in-zone fault, and K2A was returned to service on May 11, 2012.

Once an in-zone fault was ruled out as a root cause of the trip, the CDWR Protection Engineering Department began an investigation. A CDWR protection engineer directed a contract engineer to perform in-service load readings at the 87T high-side CT inputs using clamp-on current probes. These readings showed a significant departure from the expected 1.67 A at standard phase rotation (indicated by the black vectors), as shown in Fig. 4.




Fig. 4. In-service load readings

Additional CT measurements were taken before making up the delta configuration at the K2A CT terminal block. These readings showed that the magnitudes of the secondary currents on the selected taps (X1 and X5) were 35 percent different from one another, thus creating a standing unbalance in the 87T circuit.

Further investigation by CDWR found that at the time of the K2A 87T trip, there was a transmission line phase-to-ground fault at a neighboring substation. CDWR engineers concluded that the failing CT (see Fig. 5) combined with the system disturbance was the root cause of the 87T misoperation. The 87T circuit has since been rewired to use spare K2A high-side bushing CTs, and further testing is scheduled to identify the root cause of the CT failure.




Fig. 5. Severe wire damage resulting from transformer K2A CT failure

### B. Economic Impact

Several factors contributed to the cost of this incident. The initial testing of the transformer required time from operations to put the transformer under clearance and travel and testing time for the Sacramento testing group. Total transformer testing cost was estimated as follows:

- Operations: 8 hours • \$100 per hour = \$800
- Technicians: 32 hours • \$100 per hour = \$3,200

When at all possible, CDWR pumps at night to reduce costs. The loss of a pumping unit typically requires another unit to run during peak time to move the water required to meet the delivery schedule.

Assume the following:

- The water delivery schedule was such that the loss of Unit 2 (sourced by K2A) required an Edmonston unit to be run at peak time for 12 hours a day for 7 days.
- The peak-versus-off-peak differential is \$15 per megawatt-hour, based on historical data for May 2010.

When pumping, the Edmonston K2A draws approximately 62 MW of power. Based on this power and the assumptions previously mentioned, the energy cost of the loss of K2A was approximately \$78,000. Additionally, the root-cause analysis performed by CDWR protection engineers amounted to approximately an additional \$8,000. Based on the scenario and assumptions, the total cost to CDWR for this outage was approximately \$90,000.

Had CDWR known that K2A had an ailing CT in advance of the trip, all of the costs mentioned would have been eliminated or greatly reduced. When equipment outages are scheduled, CDWR has the capability to move extra water in advance and store it in off-channel reservoirs. Unscheduled outages, especially those involving troubleshooting efforts, have real economic impacts.

### C. K2A With Online Monitoring

As previously described, K2A is protected by electromechanical 87T relays. At the time of the Edmonston event, CDWR did not intend to install the PSM system on electromechanical systems, but rather as part of their ongoing relay upgrade project. Following this event, the question asked at CDWR was what would the relay and PSM response be to a system that had been upgraded to microprocessor-based transformer protection and the PSM system? To test the relay response, CDWR engineers injected the in-service readings recorded during the event into the microprocessor-based relays used for the transformer relay upgrades. With a slope setting of 35 percent, the injected quantities did not result in a relay action. Conversely, when the same relay was tested in the laboratory with the CDWR PSM system, the CT in question was immediately flagged as having an out-of-tolerance reading.

The CDWR practice for establishing PSM alarm thresholds is to have the PSM logic perform real-time evaluations on a known good system, which, in this case, would be motor and transformer CT readings. These readings are then compared to determine the maximum percentage difference. The number of occurrences for each percentage difference is then counted and stored over a series of days. Based on these empirical evaluations, CDWR engineers are able to develop thresholds and logic to monitor the overall health of the system.

## VII. CDWR PSM SYSTEM

The CDWR plant PSM system utilizes the PSM controller to communicate with each of the protective relays in either a generation plant or pumping plant via a serial interface. Each

relay is polled to collect the data required to test and validate each of the monitored critical protection system components. Preprogrammed test and validation logic is used to determine the current status of each component, with the results included in a daily report sent to the remote PSM server.

The plant PSM system communicates to the protective relays within the PCM network. These relays also act as nodes in the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system for the sole purpose of performing real-time validation and status reporting of critical protection system components. As mentioned, conversations with the relays use a dedicated communications interface for data acquisition only and cannot influence the operation of the SCADA network. PSM data exchanges with critical protection system components are completely isolated from SCADA conversations that may include automatic and commanded controls. Advantages to this design include system security and the ability to perform PSM maintenance without affecting SCADA operations (see Fig. 6).




Fig. 6. PSM controller system architecture

Most of the CDWR in-service devices for protection and control do not have the ability to communicate because they are based on electromechanical processes. Due to the Edmonston event, CDWR is considering extending the PSM system into these systems as well as new systems without complete communications capabilities by installing a PSM monitor next to the legacy devices. This adds the IED capability of monitoring breaker operation, protection initiation, and event reports where CT and PT connections are available. Adding a low-cost monitoring IED defers the redesign and installation of new protection until the resources are available while providing situational awareness and auditing capability in the meantime. The PSM monitor participates in mission-critical CT and PT validation along with trip circuit monitoring while new protection schemes are scheduled for installation.

## VIII. PSM CONTROLLER

The design and development of the PSM system were made possible because of the advanced functionality of the PSM controller, which provides the tools required for developing and testing this application. Equally important is controller reliability, which meets or exceeds protective relay standards and IEEE 1613, IEEE Standard Environmental and Testing Requirements for Communications Networking Devices in Electric Power Substations [4].

Only one software tool is required to build and test the PSM application, which provides easy configuration of relay integration, including data collection, data management, and data verification. The PSM controller also includes an integrated IEC 61131 logic engine to perform component validation logic through the use of graphical continuous function charts and function blocks via internationally standardized methods. The PSM controller tag processor builds daily validation reports and securely communicates them to the remote PSM server for viewing by the plant protection engineering staff [5].

The PSM controller is also responsible for collecting relay event reports, which, upon detection, are automatically forwarded to the PSM server and used to analyze system events and support PRC-005-1 documentation.

For accurate event analysis and validation reporting, the PSM controller uses a satellite clock to automatically synchronize the system clock of each connected relay by distributing an IRIG-B signal via the EIA-232 interface cable.

The PSM controller application includes the tasks discussed in the following subsections. Together, these tasks verify, test, validate, and report each monitored critical system component.

### A. Data Collection and Verification

The PSM controller uses EIA-232 serial communications operating at 19,200 bps to poll the required data from each connected relay once per second. This serial interface is completely isolated from the relay SCADA connection.

When the data are received, the PSM controller determines the quality of the requested data and attaches a quality attribute to the polled value. This attribute is included as an input to the component validation logic. The PSM controller verification process includes the following data quality checks:

- Valid communications exist between the relay and the PSM controller.
- The collected data value is within the defined reasonability range.

Table I is an example of the available PSM controller data quality flags.

TABLE I  
PSM CONTROLLER DATA QUALITY ATTRIBUTES USED IN VALIDATION LOGIC

Attributes	Type	Default Value Enumerations
q	quality_t	
validity	validity_t	Good, invalid, reserved, questionable
detailQual	detailQual_t	
overflow	BOOL	TRUE, FALSE
outOfRange	BOOL	TRUE, FALSE
badReference	BOOL	TRUE, FALSE
oscillatory	BOOL	TRUE, FALSE
failure	BOOL	TRUE, FALSE
oldData	BOOL	TRUE, FALSE
inconsistent	BOOL	TRUE, FALSE
inaccurate	BOOL	TRUE, FALSE

### B. Self-Test Diagnostics

Each relay runs continuous self-tests to monitor the internal health of its major components. If an out-of-tolerance condition is detected, the relay generates a warning or a failure alarm. When a self-test determines that one or more internal components have exceeded an expected limit but have not compromised the relay operation, a warning alarm is generated. For a severe out-of-tolerance condition, a failure alarm is issued and the relay enters a protection disabled state.

Both the relay warning and failure alarms are monitored by the PSM controller. These alarms, along with specific PSM controller self-test statuses, are used as inputs to the component validation logic. All of these alarms are also monitored by the SCADA system to quickly notify operations personnel of a potential component failure.

### C. IEC 61131 Programs and Function Blocks

The PSM controller-integrated IEC 61131 logic engine is preconfigured to access all the data and data attributes required to perform the PSM validation logic. It also provides capabilities to create function blocks, which are routines that a program can use as definitions for multiple instances to perform a specific task. Because many of the validation tests are repeated for each relay, preconfigured functions and PSM-developed function blocks are applied to reduce and simplify the validation programs [5].

### D. Validation Programs

PSM validation logic determines if a critical system component is operating as designed. Validation testing results are monitored and reported daily. A test failure could be associated with data quality, a relay or PSM controller self-test, bad CT and/or PT data values, or a relay firmware or settings change. If a component fails its validation test, the PSM controller identifies which of the test parameter(s) failed, logs the failure time, and includes the status of the failed component in the next validation report sent to the PSM server. This is accomplished by continually monitoring and processing the data required to accurately identify when a component passes or fails its validation test. The PSM controller includes validation tests for the following protection system components:

- Relay and PSM controller diagnostics
- CTs
- PTs
- CT circuits, PT circuits, and relay analog-to-digital (A/D) converters
- Protection communications
- Relay firmware
- Relay settings

#### 1) Relay and PSM Controller Diagnostics

The PSM controller includes validation logic for self-test diagnostics both within the relay and PSM controller. If any relay or PSM controller warning or failure alarm is detected, the logic identifies the failure, logs the time and the specific alarm, and transmits a failed validation report to the remote PSM server.

#### 2) CTs

CT validation compares the instantaneous A-, B-, and C-phase measured values of each relay with the A-, B-, and C-phase currents of a selected reference relay. If a phase from any one of the five relays deviates from the defined dead band, it is logged and a failed validation report is generated. This methodology allows the use of multiple instances of the same function block to simplify the validation program.

Each Thermalito generating unit has five protective relays connected to five sets of CTs (see Fig. 3). The dual primary generator relays monitor CT1 (IA, IB, IC) and CT3 (IA87, IB87, IC87), the dual primary transformer relays monitor CT2 (IAW2, IBW2, ICW2) and CT6 (IAW1, IBW1, ICW1), and the motor relay monitors CT4 (IA, IB, IC). These instantaneous measured values are polled once per second by the PSM controller and programmed as inputs to the CT

validation logic. The logic output is either pass or fail and is used to report the current status of this critical protection system component.

The CT validation logic includes the following inputs:

- Unit current output
- Instantaneous measured values
- Measured value comparison dead band
- Data quality
- Time of poll

To initiate a qualifying validation report, the logic first determines if the unit is generating a minimum output. CDWR engineers determined that the unit output current must exceed 5 percent of nominal to qualify for a valid online report. For the Thermalito generating units, this is calculated by multiplying 0.5 by the CT ratio and comparing the result with the A-phase measured value. If the unit output is below this predetermined parameter, the unit is considered offline.

If the unit meets its minimum output, the measured values for each phase from all five relays are compared with each other to determine if they are all reading values that fall within a calculated dead band. The measured values may not be exactly the same for each comparison cycle, so a reasonable dead band is applied. For the Thermalito generating units, CDWR engineers set the dead band at 2 percent of the measured value, which is based on the accuracy of the installed CTs.

Because the transformer relay measured values from CT6 (IAW1, IBW1, ICW1) are located on the high side of the transformer, a scale factor is applied before the values are compared with the other current inputs. The CT scaling parameter is based on the Thermalito transformer winding ratio and is set to 17.42.

As previously mentioned, the PSM controller determines the data quality for each of the measured values read from the relays. These quality statuses from all current readings are included in the CT validation logic. The PSM controller also assigns a time attribute each time it receives a CT measured value from a relay. This attribute is used by the CT validation logic to ensure that the 1-second comparison cycle of the CT measured values occurs within that cycle time of  $\pm 1$  second. This is accomplished by assigning a 1-second time dead band when comparing CT measurements.

The CT validation logic is designed to monitor and compare two sets of phase currents (A, B, C) from each generator and transformer relay and one set from the motor relay. If implemented in a single program, this logic becomes difficult to troubleshoot and maintain. To simplify this potential problem, the CT validation program uses one generic function block that is applied to all phases from each relay. Fig. 7 is a screenshot of the function block logic used by the CT validation program to compare and validate all phase currents.




Fig. 7. CT validation function block logic

Because the IEC 61131 logic engine allows the use of multiple instances of one function block in one program, the CT validation program includes 12 instances (one for each phase) for each generator. Fig. 8 shows the Thermalito Unit 1 function block UNIT\_1\_IA instance comparing all the A-phase currents from five relays. The UNIT\_1\_IA\_STATUS output is included in the validation report sent to the remote PSM server.




Fig. 8. CT validation function block

### 3) PTs

PT validation logic implements the same approach as that used for CTs, except that the voltages are compared instead of currents. The motor relay and each generator relay are connected to a set of PTs, which are monitored by the PSM controller. The motor relay (see Fig. 3) monitors PT3 (VA, VB, VC), and both generator relays monitor PT2 (VA, VB, VC).

The PT validation logic is similar to the CT logic, with the following exceptions:

- The unit voltage output determines an online PT validation report. CDWR set the minimum voltage limit at 2 percent of unit nominal voltage, which calculates to 7,967 Vdc.
- The generator relay loss-of-potential (LOP) target is included in the logic as an additional identifier of a failed component.

Fig. 9 is an example of the A-phase function block used by the PT validation logic program.




Fig. 9. PT validation function block

### 4) CT Circuits, PT Circuits, and Relay A/D Converters

A positive result from CT and PT testing provides validation for additional critical protection system components, including the CT and PT circuits and relay A/D converters. Comparing and validating PT and CT measured values from multiple independent sources test and validate not only the CTs and PTs but also the circuits connecting them to each relay. When measured values from multiple sources pass the associated validation test, this also validates the components responsible for calculating the value, which, in this case, is the relay A/D converter.

### 5) Protection Communications

Each generator relay incorporates a field ground module to calculate the isolation resistance between the generator field winding and ground. This measurement is used by the relay protection settings when determining a unit trip condition. Because communication to the module is necessary for the correct operation of the protection function, the field ground module is monitored by the PSM controller and included in the relay self-test diagnostic validation report.

### 6) Relay Firmware

Relay firmware changes are usually implemented to correct an existing issue that affects the correct operation of a relay or to add a new feature. CDWR protection engineers document installed relay firmware as part of the commissioning process and record any changes when they occur. The PSM controller includes capabilities to automatically monitor the present firmware revision and alarm changes to the relay installed firmware. Each relay includes the version of its presently installed firmware, which is continuously monitored by the PSM controller. If new firmware is installed, the PSM controller logs the new version with the date and time of installation and the firmware validation logic issues a firmware validation report to the remote PSM server.

### 7) Relay Settings

CDWR documents their commissioned settings for all installed relays. If a change is required, it is the responsibility of the assigned protection engineer to install, test, commission, and record the new settings. To avoid a possible settings change issue, the installed settings are continuously monitored by the PSM controller. If new settings are installed, the PSM controller logs the change time and date and the relay settings validation logic issues a relay settings validation report to the remote PSM server.






Fig. 10. System communications architecture

### IX. PSM LAN/WAN COMMUNICATIONS

The PSM controller continuously monitors, tests, and validates each critical protection system component. At the end of each 24-hour period, the PSM controller transmits a plant validation report to the remote PSM server. Communications from each plant to the PSM server utilize the existing CDWR SCADA network, which provides a secure LAN/WAN connection from each PSM controller to the centrally located server (see Fig. 10).

Plant protection engineers access the daily validation reports via PSM clients located in the plant maintenance engineering office.

### X. SYSTEM SECURITY

The PSM system is designed to provide secure communications across the CDWR SCADA LAN/WAN by incorporating existing firewalls and a demilitarized zone (DMZ) to completely isolate SCADA and PSM communications. The PSM system adds additional security by initiating all report conversations from the PSM controller, thus reducing the potential of a rogue or accidental attempt to compromise the system. PSM controller security features perform the following actions:

- Block any accidental or rogue attempt to implement a remote control action to the connected relays.
- Block any accidental or rogue attempt to remotely change the relay or PSM settings.
- Permit relay and PSM controller settings changes only through the front serial port using the secure authentication and password process.
- Initiate all validation and relay event report conversations from the PSM controller to prevent a remote accidental or rogue interaction.

### XI. VALIDATION REPORTS AND LOGS

Validation reports, as shown in Fig. 11, provide CDWR protection engineers with a simple view of how the remote protection systems are performing on a daily basis. Using the PSM client, the system can be quickly inspected for a potential critical protection system component failure. Daily results are viewed, acknowledged, and archived to support the CDWR PSMP.

If a validation report fails, the plant protection engineer is notified and corrective action is initiated. To identify where a validation test fails, the protection engineer accesses the PSM controller log via its web-based interface and inspects the logged data associated with the critical protection system component of each relay. The system uses both the PSM client displays and email to notify the protection engineering staff of a failed validation report.




Fig. 11. Validation report

The result of each validation test is recorded by the PSM controller to determine if a failed test qualifies as a countable event. A countable event occurs when a protection system component has failed and requires repair or has contributed to a protection system misoperation. Because each test occurs on

a once-per-second cycle, it is possible to have an isolated negative result due to an anomaly that generates a negative validation test. To determine if an intermittent failure is a countable event, the PSM controller tracks all failures and calculates if the monitored component should be included in the daily validation report.

Server data archives are organized to access all recorded validation reports. This is accomplished with a file system that stores events by year, month, and day. The results of the daily validation reports are filed under one of three categories: *G\_Report* (pass), *NG\_Report* (fail), or *OL\_Report* (offline because of a shutdown or maintenance), as shown in Fig. 12.




Fig. 12. PSM folder and file structure

## XII. EVENT REPORTS

Each relay includes settings to generate a 30-cycle event report, including 1 cycle of pre-fault data, in response to a fault or other disturbance. The report includes current and voltage data, relay element states, and I/O statuses. When an event occurs, the following steps happen:

- Relays automatically inform the PSM controller of the new event.
- The PSM controller collects the event report and notifies the remote PSM server.
- The PSM controller pushes the event report across the SCADA network to the server, where it is time-tagged, displayed, and archived.

If a generator breaker trips as a result of its commissioned settings, the event report is used to validate the relay breaker control output contact, breaker control circuit, and breaker apparatus. If the recorded event includes information that identifies a critical system component failure, it is logged, protection engineers are notified of a potential misoperation, and the event report is included in the PSMP support documentation.

An important feature for this system is the ability of the PSM controller to perform continuous monitoring of the critical components of each relay while also supporting

automatic event retrieval. This is accomplished by deploying a serial protocol capable of interleaving these two conversations at the same time.

## XIII. FUTURE ADDITIONS

CDWR protection engineers are considering expanding the system to include additional monitoring by installing trip coil monitors (TCMs). TCMs provide output contacts that indicate the present status of breaker or lockout relay trip coil or trip circuit connection continuity. Although they do not provide continuous validation for the dc trip circuits and other interrupting devices, TCMs do contribute to their validation when combined with the normal operation of the breaker. The TCM outputs would be wired directly to the PSM controller inputs and mapped to additional validation logic. Each time the breaker operated, the PSM system would record the event and generate a validation report verifying the relay input and output contacts, dc trip circuit, and breaker operation.

## XIV. CONCLUSION

Generator and transmission protection relays can be described as silent sentinels that only demonstrate their designed function when a protection event occurs. Typically, an event may not happen for an extended period of time. This can increase the possibility of a false operation or a failure to operate on a protection event due to an undetected critical protection system component failure, noncommissioned settings, or other potential issues. The PSM system helps mitigate these possibilities by continuously monitoring many of the generation plant critical protection system components, updating their statuses through daily reports, and increasing protection system engineering awareness through the use of visualization and logging tools. Additional PSM features include isolating the system from SCADA (to minimize security and operational outage requirements) and archiving validation and event reports (to support the PRC-005-1 PSMP). CDWR continues to investigate the development of additional monitoring capabilities, including the installation of TCMs, which would enhance awareness of the breaker and dc trip circuits while adding additional PSMP support documentation.

CDWR pumping plants, such as Edmonston, were not originally considered for PSM installations because they do not fall under the NERC PRC-005-1 requirements. After the K2A transformer event, CDWR is now considering adopting the PSM system to monitor these critical assets via predictive alarming in order to keep them online and avoid expensive downtime. This can be accomplished by installing inexpensive IEDs next to electromechanical protection devices to communicate critical data to the PSM system to assist CDWR protection engineers in preventing critical asset failures.

## XV. REFERENCES

- [1] NERC Standard PRC-005-2 – Protection System Maintenance and Testing. Available: <http://www.nerc.com>.
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- [4] IEEE Standard 1613, IEEE Standard Environmental and Testing Requirements for Communications Networking Devices in Electric Power Substations.
- [5] IEC 61131-3, Programmable Controllers – Part 3: Programming Languages.

## XVI. BIOGRAPHIES

**Derek Stewart, P.E.**, spent 6 years in the U.S. Navy, where he was a nuclear plant operator and electrician aboard fast attack submarines. Upon exiting the Navy, he worked as an electronics technician at Intel for 2 years before going back to school. Derek received his BSEE, magna cum laude, from California State University, Sacramento, in 2002. He then worked for the California Department of Water Resources until 2010, where he was their senior protection engineer. He currently works at Relay Application Innovation, Inc. (RAI) as a protection and integration engineer. Since joining RAI, Derek has worked on several wind farms but is primarily focused on hydroelectric generation and large motor protection.

**Robin Jenkins** has a BSET degree from California State University, Chico. From 1984 to 1988, he was employed as a systems integration engineer for Atkinson System Technologies. From 1988 to 1999, he was with the California Department of Water Resources, where he worked as an associate and then senior control system engineer. From 1999 to 2007, he worked for Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. (SEL) as a senior integration application engineer. From 2007 to 2009, he rejoined the California Department of Water Resources as the control systems branch chief. He is currently employed by SEL, where he holds the position of integration application engineer and is responsible for technical support, application assistance, and training for SEL customers in Northern California.

**David Dolezilek** received his BSEE from Montana State University and is the sales and customer service technology director of Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. He has experience in electric power protection, integration, automation, communication, control, SCADA, and EMS. He has authored numerous technical papers and continues to research innovative technology affecting the industry. David is a patented inventor and participates in numerous working groups and technical committees. He is a member of the IEEE, the IEEE Reliability Society, CIGRE working groups, and two International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) technical committees tasked with global standardization and security of communications networks and systems in substations.